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Derivatives exposures across large financial institutions often contribute to – if 
not necessarily create – systemic risk.  During a crisis, lack of adequate understanding of 
such exposures often compromises regulatory ability to unwind an institution, inducing 
large-scale backstops and counterparty bailouts.  It is often claimed – in spite of the 
massive assistance that was provided in this crisis to deal with derivatives exposures – 
that derivative contracts are well collateralized so that counterparty risk on derivatives 
exposures is not a significant issue.  Documenting evidence that supports or refutes this 
claim beyond reasonable doubt is currently infeasible due to the poor quality – and lack 
of standardization – of derivatives disclosures by financial firms.  Nevertheless, all 
available evidence points against the claim that counterparty risk in derivative exposures 
is always well collateralized.   
 
In many important cases that contributed to the crisis, most notably but not 
exclusively the case of A.I.G. Financial Products, collateralization was weak.
2  Some 
reports also suggest that the problem is probably of non-trivial magnitudes and that going 
forward derivatives exposures are likely to remain a potentially important contributor to 
systemic risk.  For instance, using information from the 10-Q quarterly statements, the 
IMF reports estimate that the five key institutions that are active in the OTC derivatives 
market – Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, JP Morgan, Bank of America, and Morgan Stanley 
– were jointly carrying almost $500 billion in OTC derivative payables exposure as of 
3Q09.
3 The report also estimates that five largest European banks – Deutsche Bank, 
Barclays, UBS, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Credit Suisse – had about $600-$700 
billion in under-collateralized risk (measured by residual derivative payables) as of 
December 2008. This residual exposure arises for two reasons, as per the IMF report. 
First, sovereigns, as well as AAA-rated insurers, corporations, large banks and 
multilateral institutions “do not post adequate collateral since they are viewed by large 
complex financial institutions as privileged and (apparently) safe clients.” Second, 
                                                        
1 This proposal is partly based on the chapter “Regulating OTC Derivatives” co-authored with Or Shachar 
and Marti G Subrahmanyam, in the book “Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd-Frank Act and the New 
Architecture of Global Finance”, NYU Stern and John Wiley & Sons, November 2010.  The author is 
grateful to Melissa Johnston and John Yan for research assistance and comments from Or Shachar and 
participants at the NBER conference “Measuring Systemic Risk Initiative” (October 2010). 
2 For example, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, released in January 2011, reports: “In the housing 
boom, CDS were sold by firms that failed to put up any reserves or initial collateral or to hedge their 
exposure. In the run-up to the crisis, AIG, the largest U.S. insurance company, would accumulate a one-
half trillion dollar position in credit risk through the OTC market without being required to post one 
dollar’s worth of initial collateral or making any other provision for loss. AIG was not alone….” 
3 Manmohan Singh, 2010, “Collateral, Netting and Systemic Risk in the OTC Derivatives Market”, IMF 
Working Paper 10/99.  
 dealers have agreed in their bilateral contracts not to mandate adequate collateral for 
dealer-to-dealer positions whereby credit-worthy dealers often post no collateral to each 
other for these contracts. 
 
These reports raise several pertinent questions:   
 
  What is the true potential exposure on derivatives dealings of large institutions?   
 
  How much of this exposure is collateralized?   
 
  Is collateral posted adequate under some conservative requirements of maximum 
counterparty risk in case of system-wide stress when besides the emergence of 
counterparty risk, positions become illiquid, hard to replace and may have to be 
unwound at short notice?  
 
  Are derivatives being deployed in under-collateralized manner to undertake 
significant maturity transformation and taking on attendant liquidity risks?
4 
 
The chapter addresses these questions by presenting the theoretical arguments that 
lead to desirability of a transparency standard for derivatives positions.  To demonstrate 
that such a standard is implementable, the chapter shows examples of existing disclosures 
from large dealer firms in their quarterly filings.  These disclosures often contain useful 
firm-level data on derivatives, but due to a lack of standardization, these are not 
aggregation-friendly for assessing the risk to the system.  The chapter highlights the 
important role that tracking of a “margin coverage ratio” (MCR), namely the ratio of a 
derivatives dealer’s cash (or liquidity, more broadly) to its contingent collateral or margin 
calls in case of a significant downgrade of its credit quality.  Finally, the chapter 
discusses the implications of the proposed standard for the Office of Financial Research 
(OFR) to be set up under the Treasury as per the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States. 
 
Case for regulatory and market disclosure of standardized derivatives reports 
 
It is useful to understand theoretically the market failure in the provision of 
information in derivatives markets.  Acharya and Engle (2009) and Acharya and Bisin 
(2010) formalize this idea under the notion of a “counterparty risk externality”.
5   
 
To illustrate the idea, suppose that counterparty A agrees to pay B. Then, A turns 
around and sells a similar contract to C. The addition to A’s position from the contract 
                                                        
4 In terms of “risk topography”, derivatives can be considered the mechanism to build contingent exposures 
– across states of nature and over time – which when not adequately collateralized or capitalized lead to 
liquidity risk.  Thus, derivatives facilitate complex forms of “liquidity mismatch”, discussed in greater 
detail in the chapter in this book by Markus Brunnermeier, Gary Gorton and Arvind Krishnamurthy. 
5 Acharya, Viral V and Robert Engle, 2009, “Derivatives trades should all be transparent,” Wall Street 
Journal, 15 May 2009, and Acharya, Viral V and Alberto Bisin, 2010, “Counterparty risk externality: 
Centralized versus over-the-counter markets,” working paper, NYU-Stern. 
 with C dilutes the payoff on its contract with B in case that A turns out ex-post to not 
have adequate funds to repay both B and C. Thus, B’s payoff dependency on what else A 
does represents a negative payoff externality on B due to A’s counterparty risk. The key 
efficiency question is whether B can adequately reflect this risk in charging price or 
adopting risk controls (e.g., margins or overall position limits) on A.  Clearly, B’s ability 
to do so depends upon whether B can observe what A does.  
 
Now, if markets are organized over-the-counter (OTC) as with many derivatives 
contracts, there is opacity at level of derivatives positions of a financial firm.  As a result 
of this opacity, counterparty risk externality described above cannot be adequately 
reflected in price and collateral arrangements.  More broadly, since generating 
information about each firm’s derivatives positions requires its cooperation but benefits 
the system at large, the firm may not fully internalize the social benefits of transparency. 
This theory predicts thus that there will be too little production of private information in 
settings that involve counterparty risk externality.  Acharya and Engle (2009) and 
Acharya and Bisin (2010) present several proposals to address this market failure.   
 
One proposal is that central clearing and margining on exchanges get around this 
failure (at least when viewed in the realm of a particular clearinghouse or exchange). 
Central counterparty or trade-guaranteeing body or exchange can observe end-of-day (or 
even intra-day) positions, and set position limits, concentration limits and margin calls 
accordingly.  This arrangement works best if the same clearing entity clears most 
products.  Yet, many markets, especially for complex and customized derivatives will 
almost necessarily remain OTC.  They cannot easily be standardized if their primary 
purpose is to provide customized hedging to some end-users and the system may not find 
it profitable to incur transaction costs in setting up clearinghouses or exchanges for these 
products if their volumes are thin.  For these remaining derivatives, some regulators have 
proposed addressing counterparty risk directly by limiting leverage (charging adequately 
high margin requirements) against them.  Still, regulatory attempts to do design such 
instrument-specific requirements have failed miserably in the design of capital 
requirements even on simpler instruments such as mortgages, loans and lines of credit.  
 
A second proposal, not necessarily exclusive of the first one, is to rely more on 
markets’ transparency at large. Suppose information on derivatives position of a financial 
firm was made available to market participants.  This would enable better pricing and 
managing of counterparty risk by markets themselves. This way, dealers would be 
incentivized to lower their counterparty risks in an efficient manner.  With a market-wide 
standard, dealers would also be incentivized to provide transparency about their own 
management of counterparty risk, a move that would benefit them the most in times of 
significant aggregate uncertainty when customers tend to leave business with riskier 
counterparties, triggering a “franchise value run”, as witnessed by Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley around the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and instead “fly to quality”.   
 
A common argument against such public transparency of positions and 
counterparty level data is that it reduces economic benefits of undertaking these positions 
in the first place and could reduce risk-sharing gains for the economy.  A compromise would be to provide market transparency with a reasonable lag, so that price impacts for 
trading parties are minimized, and yet the lagged information is useful for counterparty 
risk assessments. 
 
Finally, it is highly likely that an efficient transparency standard for derivatives 
will in turn produce an efficient information system at each financial firm that aggregates 
its own derivatives positions in different subsidiaries, markets and countries. This could 
improve firm’s own risk management by providing timely information to senior 
management and chief risk officers about enterprise-wide risks. 
 
A transparency standard for derivatives and counterparty risk 
 
What might a transparency standard for derivatives look like?  Here is an 
example.  All dealers as well as large swap players provide to a centralized data 
repository frequent (for example, weekly or bi-weekly) risk reports on their derivatives 
positions as follows: 
 
•        Classification of exposures into  
o        product types (such as single-name CDS, index CDS, interest rate swaps, 
currency swaps, commodities, equities, etc.),  
o        by major currency categories, 
o        maturity (buckets) of contracts,  
o        type of counterparty (bank, broker-dealer, corporation, government-
sponsored enterprise, monoline, insurance firm, etc.), and 
o        credit rating of counterparties. 
 
•        Size of exposures could be reported as
6  
o        gross (maximum notional exposure), 
o        in fair-value terms (to account for mark-to-market changes),  
o        net (taking account of bilateral netting arrangements), and 
o        uncollateralized net (recognizing collateral posted by counterparties). 
 
•        Uncollateralized net exposures could be disclosed also as “potential exposures” 
based on stress tests
7 that take account of  
o   several notches of ratings downgrade of counterparty and its ability to post 
additional collateral; and 
o  counterparty default and replacement risk for the exposures assuming 
severe market conditions such as replacement time of two to four weeks.
8 
                                                        
6 The crucial item here is “uncollateralized” as without knowledge of collateral backing the contracts, 
there is the risk of over-stating the derivatives exposures, but more importantly, it would create the 
uncertainty about magnitude of risk in the first place. 
7 The focus of the proposed standard is on stress tests based on counterparty risk. Nevertheless, stress tests 
based on macroeconomic scenarios, as proposed in Darrell Duffie’s chapter in this book [“Systemic Risk 
Exposures: A 10-by-10-by-10 Approach”], could also be augmented to the standard. 
8 In particular, the current disclosure of Level-1, Level-2 and Level-3 of assets’ underlying value should 
also be enhanced to report potential illiquidity and opacity of positions (not just for derivatives), so that an  
To facilitate the understanding of contingent or potential exposures and for deriving 
implications for systemically risky exposures, all dealers as well as large swap players 
could also provide two important and novel reports: 
 
•        Margin call reports that list the additional collateral liabilities of the firm as  
o        total additional liability in case the firm was to experience one, two or more 
(say, up to six) notch downgrades, and 
o        largest such liabilities aggregated by different counterparties (say, ten 
largest). 
 
•        Concentration reports that provide the above information for the entity’s largest 
counterparty exposures (say, the largest ten) or accounting for at least a substantial 
proportion (say, 75%) of the total exposure. 
  
When aggregated across firms, the standardized firm-level reports aggregate to a 
“map” of derivatives positions and their risks (mark-to-market risk, counterparty risk and 
liquidity risk) as shown in Exhibit 1. 
 
Although such a transparency standard appears at first to involve a large amount 
of information gathering, the costs of such disclosure are not likely to be that onerous. 
Sophisticated investment banks already maintain such information for their internal risk 
management purposes, and they do publish some of it in their quarterly reports (though in 
a highly non-standardized and less granular manner, as explained below). Therefore, it is 
unlikely to be a significant additional burden for them to disclose such information to 
regulators in a standardized format at frequent intervals. Some aggregated versions that 
respect customer confidentiality can then be made transparent to markets at large, say on 
a monthly or at least quarterly basis, to help enhance market discipline against the build-
up of uncollateralized exposures.    
 
What do financial firms currently do and do not disclose? 
 
  The 10-Q filings of financial firms, as for any SEC-regulated firms in the United 
States, require disclosure of all materially relevant information.  In case of financial 
firms, given their increasingly large presence in derivatives markets, these filings also 
contain information on positions – and on their risks – in these markets. A few examples 
below help illustrate what is useful in the current reports, and what changes would be 
necessary to adhere to a transparency standard such as the one outlined above. 
 
  Consider for example the reporting of credit protection sold by Citigroup and 
JPMorgan Chase, shown from their 10-Q filings in Exhibits 2a and 2b.  Citigroup reports 
its positions by industry, product and credit rating of underlying reference entity, whereas 
JPMorgan reports them by maturity and credit rating of underlying entity.  While it is 
                                                                                                                                                                     
asset could be Level-1 in normal times, but the disclosure would also state whether it is likely to be Level-
1, Level-2 or Level-3 in reasonable stress scenarios.  
 possible to draw some relative conclusions about average credit rating of entities they 
write protection against (Citigroup wrote more risky protection than JPMorgan), other 
aspects of disclosures are not comparable.  Nevertheless, the exhibit reveals that financial 
firms could report these data in a standardized manner if required to do so. 
 
  Next, consider Exhibits 3a and 3b that show Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan 
Chase’s reporting of counterparty credit risk in their over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
positions.  Goldman Sachs reports the positions as well as their value net of collateral by 
credit rating of counterparty, by risk types and by maturity buckets. In this case, 
JPMorgan’s reporting provides similar information as that of Goldman Sachs, facilitating 
a straightforward comparison. One can easily reach the conclusion that overall, in terms 
of percentage of overall exposures, JPMorgan’s counterparty credit risk profile is safer 
than that of Goldman Sachs, as 40% of JPMorgan’s OTC derivative credit exposure is 
with counterparties at AA and higher level versus around 20% for Goldman Sachs. 
 
Notably, no data on concentration of exposures in derivatives are currently 
revealed in any of the 10-Q filings.  This creates a significant challenge in assessing 
systemic risk based on current public disclosures of financial firms. 
 
In contrast, there is some useful information on potential margin calls. Exhibit 4a 
illustrates that different financial firms report their margin liabilities in case of own 
downgrades with varying levels of granularity and “stress”.  JPMorgan’s report 
historically appears the best in a relative sense in that it includes margin liabilities for 
one-notch downgrade and up to six-notch downgrade.  Goldman Sachs, however, reports 
margin liabilities only up to two notches, and the second notch is disclosed only since the 
crisis.  It is immediately apparent from this report that JPMorgan’s liquidity risk from one 
to six-notch downgrade is far smaller in terms of multiplier on the required margin than it 
is for Goldman Sachs.   
 
No discussion of contingent liquidity risk related to margin calls can be complete 
without a discussion of A.I.G.  Exhibit 4b shows that A.I.G. reported only one notch 
downgrade risk up until 3Q 2008, and in that last quarter, reported up to two notches. 
From one to two notch, its collateral liability increased by a factor of six, a valuable piece 
of information in assessing system’s counterparty risk to A.I.G. that was not available in 
their reports until 2Q 2008.
9  As it turned out, while Moody’s and Fitch downgraded it by 
                                                        
9 This information too was available not in a well tabulated form in AIG’s 10-Q of 3Q 2008 but in the body 
of the text: “Credit ratings are important to AIG’s business, results of operations and liquidity. 
Downgrades in AIG’s credit ratings could increase AIG’s borrowing costs and could adversely affect its 
competitive position and liquidity. With respect to AIG’s liquidity, it is estimated that, as of the close of 
business on April 30, 2008, based on AIGFP’s outstanding municipal guaranteed investment agreements 
(GIAs) and financial derivative transactions at that date, a downgrade of AIG’s longer−term senior debt 
ratings to ‘Aa3’ by Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s) or ‘AA−’ by Standard & Poor’s, a division of the 
McGraw−Hill Companies (S&P) would permit counterparties to call for approximately $1.8 billion of 
collateral, while a downgrade to ‘A1’ by Moody’s or A+ by S&P would permit counterparties to call for 
approximately $9.8 billion of additional collateral. Further downgrades could result in requirements for 
substantial additional collateral, which could have a material adverse effect on how AIGFP manages its 
liquidity. The actual amount of collateral that AIGFP would be required to post to counterparties in the two notches, Standard & Poor’s did so by three notches, resulting in collateral liability of 
$20 bln which was compounded upwards eventually to $32 bln given mark-to-market or 
fair-value adjustments due to deteriorating market conditions.  
 
  Finally, it is instructive to use these margin call reports in conjunction with the 
cash position of these firms to assess their “margin coverage ratios” (MCR).  In 4Q 2008, 
JPMorgan Chase had cash-equivalent assets of $26 bln, so that its MCR was over four, 
since its margin call for a six-notch downgrade is $6.3 bln. Goldman Sachs had cash 
assets (its “total global core excess”) of over $100 bln, giving it an MCR of around 50 for 
a margin call of $2.14 bln at a two-notch downgrade.  That is, while Goldman Sachs’ 
liquidity risk due to collateral calls is substantial, it also holds a lot of unencumbered cash 
to deal with this risk.  In contrast, A.I.G. had cash assets of just around $2.5 bln in 2008, 
giving it an MCR of between 1 and 2 for its $1.8 bln margin call at one-notch downgrade. 
Once it revealed its two-notch downgrade risk in August 2008, its MCR for two-notch 
downgrade was just around 0.25 as its (hitherto un-disclosed) margin call exposure was 
up at $9.8 bln with a two-notch downgrade.  A.I.G.’s margin risk was simply not well 
covered for a “stress” downgrade scenario by its holdings of cash assets.  Importantly, for 
a multi-notch downgrade, this was not at all transparent based on it 10-Q’s prior to 
August 2008. 
 
   The purpose behind reporting these data from 10-Q filings is two-fold.  One, to 
make it clear that financial firms can, and do, report much of the standard proposed in 
this chapter for derivatives reporting.  Second, to illustrate that standardized data can 
support and enhance the assessment of counterparty risk in derivatives markets using 
simple analytical tools such as the margin coverage ratio (MCR) that is analogous to 
interest coverage ratio employed by credit rating analysts in their assessment of non-
financial corporations’ liquidity risk.  
 
We now turn to specific benefits delivered by the proposed standard with respect 
to the recent financial reforms legislated in the United States.  
 
Implications for the Dodd-Frank reforms and the Office of Financial Research  
 
The “Wall Street Transparency and Accountability” part of the Dodd-Frank Act 
of 2010 requires that 
 
•  All existing derivative positions (both cleared and un-cleared “swaps”) be reported to a 
swap data repository within 180 days of its enactment; 
•  All new positions – cleared or un-cleared – be reported starting 90 days after the 
enactment (or an alternative legislated period);  
•  The repository be tasked with providing data to the regulatory agencies – including 
foreign and international agencies, if applicable – to minimize systemic risk; 
                                                                                                                                                                     
event of such downgrades depends on market conditions, the fair value of outstanding affected transactions 
and other factors prevailing at the time of the downgrade. Additional obligations to post collateral would 
increase the demands on AIGFP’s liquidity.” •  The repository be tasked with publishing aggregate market information (trading and 
clearing in major swap categories, participants and developments in new products) to 
public twice a year;  
•  There be real-time public reporting, meaning “to report data relating to a swap 
transaction, including price and volume, as soon as technologically practicable after the 
time at which the transaction has been executed”; and,  
•  Such public reporting, however, not include counterparty or customer information, and 
also have a delay exemption for “block trades” (to be defined by rule-makers) taking 
account of the impact of disclosure of such trades on liquidity.  
 
While these attempts to improve transparency in the derivatives markets are 
commendable, there are also several notable omissions: 
 
•  Prices of new trades are often not sufficient to mark old positions, since derivatives are 
often struck at terms so as to be at zero fair-value to both involved parties. It is essential 
to have for derivative trades their potential exposure and collateral risk, not just current 
mark-to-market values.  However, such risk management variables are not required by 
the Act to be collected by data repository.  Indeed, there is no required reporting of 
collateral information of any trades, precluding analysis of potential counterparty risk. 
•  While clearinghouses will clearly collect required counterparty information for trades 
they clear and will (hopefully) set adequate initial and variation margins to 
counterparties, several complex derivatives positions will still remain OTC.  
Understanding the counterparty risk in these OTC positions is crucial for margining on 
clearinghouses as well as in broader assessments of credit risk and systemic risk. 
•  Legislating counterparty risk transparency for regulators may have some favorable 
effects.  Extending such transparency in some lagged form to markets might help 
reinstitute market discipline as a buffer against regulatory failures to contain risks 
adequately. 
 
  All of these omissions are potentially addressed by the proposed transparency 
standard in this chapter.
10  Although there will remain private data repositories such as 
the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC), it is beyond doubt that over time 
the Office for Financial Research (OFR), which is required by the Dodd-Frank Act to be 
set up under the Treasury for collecting, analyzing and disseminating systemic risk 
relevant information and early warnings, will require derivatives counterparty risk 
information.  An adequate, standardized, and self-reported but audited disclosure of 
derivatives positions and risks by the largest financial firms would be invaluable in such 
an exercise.  The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), representing heads of 
regulatory agencies in the United States, formed as per the Dodd-Frank Act and charged 
with the task of identifying systemically important financial institutions (SIFI’s) and 
regulating them, would also find such standardized reporting on derivatives of direct use 
as this would reveal information about which firms are currently – or potentially – too 
                                                        
10 Indeed, the current hedge-accounting standards could also be layered upon the proposed standard to 
make it clear what proportion of the exposures are for hedging purposes and to account for hedging effects 
in reported values and risks of positions. interconnected to fail.  Academics, regulators, accounting boards, and derivatives dealers 




In summary, better market discipline and regulatory intelligence about counterparty risk 
in derivatives market likely requires a new transparency standard.  This standard could be 
layered on top of the current quarterly disclosures of derivatives positions and risks by 
financial firms, but with a greater frequency for regulatory reports.  Of particular 
importance is position-level transparency of large derivatives players, not just in a static 
sense, but also as potential exposure to stress scenarios, margin call exposure in case of 
their credit quality deterioration, and concentration exposure for assessment of systemic 
interconnections.  Such transparency would facilitate tracking valuable counterparty risk 
indicators, most notably the “margin coverage ratio” (MCR) that compares a firm’s cash 
position to its margin call exposure under stress scenarios. Exhibit 1: Outcome of the proposed transparency standard for 
derivatives 
 
Disclosure  Firm 1  Firm 2  …  Firm n 
Exposures  - Product type         
                  - Maturity bucket         
                 - Counterparty type         
                 -  Counterparty      
                    credit rating 
       
Value – Maximum loss (“potential exposure”)         
           – Uncollateralized net         
           – Net of collateral         
           – By Currency Categories         
Collateral posted        
Margin Report: Additional collateral to post 
 
– One notch downgrade 
       
-  Two notch downgrade         
-  Multi-notch downgrade         




 Exhibit 2a: Citigroup’s reporting of credit derivatives as protection seller  
 
The following tables summarize the key characteristics of the Company’s credit 
derivative portfolio as protection seller (guarantor) as of September 30, 2009 and 
December 31, 2008: 
 
 
In millions of dollars as of  
  September 30, 2009   
Maximum potential 






By industry/counterparty     
Bank  $860,437 $46,071 
Broker-dealer  301,216  17,661 
Monoline  - - 
Non-financial  2,127  96 
Insurance and other 




$1,315,106  $76,581 
By Instrument:     
Credit default swaps and 
options 
$1,314,282  $76,383 
Total return swaps  824  198 
Total by instrument  $1,315,106  $76,581 
By Rating:     
Investment grade  $759,845  23,362 
Non-investment grade  422,865 33,231 
Not rated  132,396  19,988 
Total by rating  $1,315,106  $76,581 
(1) In addition, fair value amounts receivable under credit derivatives 






 Exhibit 2b: JPMorgan Chase’s reporting of credit derivatives as protection 
seller  
 
Protection sold- credit derivatives and credit-linked notes ratings/maturity profiles 
(a) 
          
December 31, 2008 (in 
millions) 






Risk rating of reference 
entity 
        
 Investment grade                   
(AAA to BBB-)
(b) 
$(177,404)  $(1,767,004)  $(713,555)  $(2,657,963)  $(215,217) 
Noninvestment grade         
(BB+ and below)
(b) 
(121,040) (992,098) (428,895)  (1,542,033)  (244,975) 
Total  $(298,444)  $(2,759,102)  $(1,142,450)  $(4,199,996)  $(460,192) 
(a) The contractual maturity for single-name CDS contract generally ranges from 
three months to ten years and the contractual maturity for index CDS is 
generally five years. The contractual maturity for CLNs typically ranges from 
three to five years 
(b) Ratings scale is based upon the Firm’s internal ratings, which generally 
correspond to ratings defined by S&P and Moody’s 
(c) Amounts are shown on a gross basis, before the benefit of legally enforceable 

















OTC Derivative Credit Exposure 
(in millions) 











10 Years or 
Greater 
Total Netting 





$ 1,482  $ 3,249  $3,809  $ 2,777  $ 11,317  $ (5,481)  $ 5,836  $ 5,349 
AA/Aa2  6,647 12,741  7,695  9,332  36,415 (20,804) 15,611  11,815 
A/A2  31,999  46,761  29,324  31,747  139,831  (111,238)  28,593  24,795 
BBB/Baa
2 
4,825 7,780  5,609  8,190  26,404  (12,069) 14,335  8,041 
BB/Ba2 
or lower 
3,049  13,931  2,903  1,483  21,366  (5,357)  16,009  9,472 
Unrated  666 1,570  387  148  2,771  (224)  2,547  1,845 
Total  $48,668














 Exhibit 3b: JPMorgan Chase’s reporting of OTC derivatives counterparty 
exposure 
 
Ratings profile of derivative receivables MTM 
 
Rating Equivalent                                          2008                                               2007 
December 31, 
(in millions, except ratios) 
Exposure 









% of exposure 
net of all 
collateral 
AAA/Aaa to AA-/Aa3  $ 68, 708  48%  $38,314  57% 
A+A1 to A-/A3  24,748 17  9,855  15 
BBB+/Baa1 to BBB-/Baa3  15,747  11  9,335  14 
BB+/Ba1 to B-/B3  28,186 20  9,451  14 
CCC+/Caa1 and below  5,421  4  357  - 



















Credit-Risk-Related Contingent Features in Derivatives  
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2006-Q4  26.6       NA 
2007-Q1  27.0  2.6  0.1  607.0  NA 
2007-Q2  28.3 2.9  0.2 598.0 NA 
2007-Q3  32.8  3.2  0.3  752.0  NA 
2007-Q4  33.5 2.5  0.2 595.0 NA 
2008-Q1  48.5  3.4  0.3  957.0  NA 
2008-Q2  58.2 3.5  0.6 785.0 NA 
2008-Q3  60.1  4.3  0.9  669.0  NA 
2008-Q4  99.1 6.4  2.2 897.0  2140 
2009-Q1  82.3  4.9  1.4  941.0  2140 
2009-Q2  67.7 4.0  1.2 763.0  1930 
2009-Q3  66.0  4.4  1.5  685.0  1700 




















  2007-1 2007-2 2007-3  2007-4 
Marginal Call Reports         
 Additional Collateral for One-notch Downgrade Rating $902 $847 $830  $1390 
Additional Collateral for Two-notch Downgrade Rating         
Additional Collateral for Three-notch Downgrade Rating       
Additional Collateral for Multi-Notch Downgrade Rating         
  2008-1 2008-2 2008-3  Actual 
Marginal Call Reports         
Additional Collateral for One-notch Downgrade Rating  $1800 $1200 $1800  
Additional Collateral for Two-notch Downgrade Rating      $9800  Moody’s 
and Fitch 
downgrade 
Additional Collateral for Three-notch Downgrade Rating    $20000  S&P 
downgrade 
Additional Collateral for Multi-notch Downgrade Rating      $32000  Market risk 
adjustment 
 
 